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Introduction
In order to maintain safe operations, organisations must continuously review and monitor their risks. This means that the results of safety studies and/or the evidence of issues collected from operational experience must be translated into a format that can be analysed, reviewed and acted upon, and new data about the level of risk continuously collected to keep the safety information up to date (Monferini et al., 2013) . This helps to create an 'informed culture', defined by Reason (1997) as a culture in which both management and operators are informed of and knowledgeable about the factors that influence safety as a whole. When the available information is shared between all applicable levels of the organisation, a Common Operational Picture (COP) can be created as the basis for safe and reliable system operation (Kontogiannis et al., this issue). One method of creating this shared understanding, or COP, is through the development and implementation of a risk register.
A risk database, or risk register, is a central tool for organisations to use to monitor and reduce risks, both those identified during initial safety assessments and those emerging during operations (Whipple and Pitblado, 2010) . The risk register should contain all analysed risks and should prioritise the areas that require managerial attention and typically contains information describing each risk, an assessment of the likelihood and consequences, a ranking according to a risk matrix, the risk owner, and information on the mitigations to be put in place (Filippin and Dreher, 2004) . When populated with information on each risk, including risk ranking, the risk register can analysed to present the risk profile for different aspects of the organisation (Filippin and Dreher, 2004) . When reviewed and updated over time, it can also be analysed to present trends within the risk profile and focus management attention on the highest risk activities or facilities (Whipple and Pitblado, 2010) .
Risk registers are used in a variety of industries, e.g. medicine (Brown, 2004) and construction (Dunović et al., 2013) , as well as high hazard industries such as oil and gas (Hasle et al., 2009 ) and electricity generation (Leonard, 1995) . They are typically used either to support safe operations or to support safe and efficient project management (e.g. De Zoysa and Russell, 2003) . Cooke-Davies (2002) found that the adequacy with which a visible risk register was maintained was one of the key success factors for project management. Patterson and Neailey (2002) highlight the importance of the risk register and suggest that the benefit of a risk register is as a method to enable all stakeholders to "consciously evaluate and manage the risks as part of a decision making process" (pp. 365). They also note the importance of the risk register in documenting the process of reducing risk and introducing mitigations. However, Kutsch and Hall (2010) warn of the danger of risk registers becoming 'tick-box' exercises when the owners and contributors do not have a real ability to influence the risks -the danger of irrelevance. Despite the clear importance of risk registers in the risk management process, there is very little guidance on their development and implementation (Dunović et al., 2013) .
Research conducted by the Design Information Group at Bristol
University found that 67% of their questionnaire respondents working in Engineering Design project, documented their risks on either a paper or computer-based risk register (Crossland et al., 1998) . However these were generally individual solutions,
• usually specific to the organisation and sometimes even specific to a location and hosted locally suggesting the format of a individual risk register than a company wide shared solution (Patterson and Neailey, 2002) .
This paper attempts to address the gap in guidance on construction of risk registers by describing the results of a case study in which a risk register was established in an electricity generation company across multiple locations and the preliminary results were used for Management Review decisions. The single central risk register is aimed at collating risks from across the business, including various power stations across different geographical locations. The objectives of the project were:
To develop a risk register data structure supporting consistent hazard identification and risk rating across different sites;
To develop equivalent severity and frequency scales for different loss types and for application across different business units, such as operations, maintenance, finance, HR, etc.;
To use the risk register to highlight key business risks to senior management;
To use the risk register to gather information about mitigation measures in place and their effectiveness;
To embed the risk register within a risk management process and share good practices across the company.
Description of the case study
The analysis presented in this paper is based on the development and implementation of a company wide risk register in an electricity-generating organisation in the Republic of Ireland. As part of an on-going process of Process Safety improvement, the organisation identified a need to advance the identification, analysis and management of risks across the business, and to hold these risks in a format that facilitated comparison and tracking. A project team was therefore assembled, with representatives from different stations and specialisms, to create a risk register capable of meeting the to assist with tracking the overall risk profile, the type of risk and associated losses (e.g. safety, financial, reputational, legal, etc.), and the target risk level.
To facilitate risk evaluation, a risk register should be supported with a risk matrix and associated severity and likelihood scales.
Different processes and parts of the organisation may already be using matrices and scales, and in order to apply a companywide risk register, these may need to be aligned for consistency.
Problem definition
Risk management during operations relies on the on-going identification, evaluation, and monitoring of risks with the potential to affect safety or performance. The partner organisation in this case study, had an existing process which relied on the plant managers from each station across the business reporting their 'Top 10' risks to a central risk manager who collated and analysed the full set for presentation to senior management. A number of issues were identified with this process, particularly:
It was labour intensive;
Not transparent to the stations reporting risks;
Did not facilitate learning across the organisation;
-------Not consistent in the reporting and rating of risks;
Not comprehensive in the types of risks covered;
Only updated quarterly;
No ability to data-mine or trend the data.
In order to better manage process safety, the company required a single risk register to be developed that supported the hazard concepts. It cannot be taken for granted that a potentially diverse user group will all have a similar understanding of the terms 'hazard' and 'risk' and a brief training session was used to reinforce shared understanding of the terms. A further challenge that emerged during the early development was the differences between individual and corporate perspectives on risk. Risks may have different consequences depending on the viewpoint of an individual/group (Leva et al., 2012) . For example, in the energy industry, a transformer failure would have high consequences for an individual generation station as they cannot export the electricity generated. However, it is not necessarily an issue for the business as they may be able to compensate with another station, and can even be a benefit to those other stations that will receive a higher payment for exporting more electricity. These different perspectives must be reconciled by monetizing values of those risks and aggregating them at overall business level.
Ultimately, the workshops led to the identification of 10 high level requirements (Table 2 ) and the supporting components of a risk matrix and associated loss and consequence tables. These high level requirements were generated specifically for the case study, but are generally applicable to company wide risk registers. Their purpose is to guide the development of both the specific solution for the risk register, and the supporting risk management process. A strong risk management process is required to ensure that the effort invested in development, implementing, populating and maintaining the Risk Register is translated into real safety improvements. To support this, a business process map and use case was generated to describe the roles and activities involved in the risk management process. This was refined during the workshops to generate a practical, stable solution that could be applied across the business. Fig. 1 reports the use case diagrams developed for the company involved. 
Risk register supporting elements
Four main supporting elements were developed for the risk register:
The consequence/loss categories;
The likelihood categories;
The risk matrix;
The hazard categories.
Initial versions for each of these were included in the first rollout of the Risk Register, and were subsequently iterated on the basis of user feedback during the first year of use. The elements shown below are current at the time of writing, but as the Risk
Register further embeds and business requirements change, these elements may also continue to evolve.
Consequence/loss categories

One of the central functions of the risk register is to help judge
where money should be invested. If this decision were to be based only on generated income, then the larger plants would receive a huge share of the available funds. However, it may also be important for safety and environmental reasons that the smaller plants are properly maintained. Therefore, the categories of losses covered by the risk register in terms of equivalent monetised values are not only the ones explicitly linked to financial implications but also the ones covering technical performance, safety, environmental and reputational effects. In order to maintain consistency the equivalent scales developed for each loss type are broadly equivalent. The scales developed for each category are shown in Table 3 . It is always possible for a user to indicate if a certain type of loss category does not apply. The use of four categories matches industry common practice.
Hazard categories
The risk register should monitor technical and non-technical hazards in order to fully represent potential risks. In this case, ISO 17776 in combination with an analysis of the hazards and risks already captured within the company was used to provide a framework of hazards within the risk register. The initial framework is shown in Table 5 . This will allow the company to systematically review each hazard category and modify the classification system for new and emerging hazards after during the testing period and after if needed. wind power). The data was re-coded to determine a reduced set of hazards for use. This reduced the overall number of hazard codes from 109 to 72.
Assessment of mitigations
Existing and planned mitigations for each risk are captured and are classified using the following scheme:
Discontinuing the activity;
Remove/substitute the hazard;
Actions to reduce the impact and/or probability of the risk;
Transferring the risk (e.g. insurance);
• Retaining and monitoring.
Furthermore the users are asked to provide a self-assessment from 1 to 5 to rank the effectiveness of the control measures taken. It is important to provide an accurate (though by nature subjective) account of how much the risk has been reduced by the actions taken. In many cases, even a significant effort does not greatly reduce the risk due to factors beyond the mitigation owner's control. At other times, even small or simple steps make a visible difference in risk reduction. Therefore, this is not a measure of quality of the mitigation but rather the risk complexity or influence (supporting/neutral/hostile) of the risk centre's environment. The scores for the Current Mitigation
Effectiveness are shown in Table 6 . The process ensures that the report is fed back to station risk specialists by the Generation Risk Reporting Manager, so that the most up to date risk information is circulated evenly and retained within the organisation for subsequent re-use.
Several KPI have been identified to monitor the use and content of the risk register and these are reported in Table 7 . 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
As part of the rollout, the stations were provided one to one training in the form of a face to face meeting or a teleconference on the new tool and asked to input their risk and during the first two quarters. Following this a risk review workshop was organized in each station to review their risk and collect feedback on the tool.
Case study evaluation
The key points for the validation of the Risk Register were:
How well the data structure supports the identification and categorisation of risks;
How the rating scheme is used to manage and prioritise risks (facilitating the risk management process);
The attitude of the stations towards use of the final tool,
including their willingness to populate data;
The perceived effectiveness and efficiency of the tool across the different stakeholders;
Assessment against the high level requirements.
The feedback was collected in two ways: of foreseen risks. Such data might be collected over time through data mining accident and incident databases, as well as the risk register itself, but this is currently beyond the ability of most organisations. The rating is therefore somewhat subjective, and even using a clearly defined scale one user may be inclined towards higher ratings than another. The differences may not be great (one point either direction), but on a five point scale this can make the difference between an amber rating (e.g. 12) or a red rating (e.g. 16). As well as the unintentional variability introduced through subjectivity, some business units might also intentionally increase their ratings to theoretically possible but unrealistic values in order to highlight an issue in their area and attract investment to address it. It is therefore necessary to include a review step in the business process underlying the risk register. This review process may have several aims, but one should be the consistent rating of risks across stations. As issues emerge, additional guidance and modifications can be added to the scales to improve the reliability of the ratings, and any changes should be fed back to users regularly to help improve consistency.
Rating scheme
The rating scheme is well-used and appears to support efficient prioritisation of the risks at station level. Some minor changes were made over the course of the implementation to clarify language and consistency.
The impact categories may need to be revised as the risk matrix is now implemented and used across various levels of risk exposure estimates also in asset management. The proposal is to harmonize in the company the matrix used for the technical risk review process for assets. This will probably imply a revision of the financial scale to get values more granular and therefore sensitive towards lower end of the scales able to capture distinctions that individual stations may consider more aligned towards their ranges of financial implications.
Station attitudes
Initial feedback from the stations has been predominantly positive and uptake has been strong; all stations have contributed risks to the register and regularly update their risks.
Feedback on the coding scheme was collected during the station workshops and used to iteratively improve the risk register during the early implementation period.
More formal collection of feedback from stations was achieved via a survey, with seven responses (representing almost 60% of the station managers). The survey determined that use of the Risk Register had improved from between quarterly and yearly for the old 'Top 10' format to between monthly and quarterly for the new Risk Register. Fig. 5 describes the overall perception of benefits of the Risk Register (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). The majority of anticipated benefits have been achieved in the eyes of the frontline users, but there is room for improvement in terms of supporting periodic reporting in terms of KPIs, the consequence rating scale, and accounting for short term emerging risks. of the data structures, ease of use and ability to overview information and drill down as required, and the use of the tool to provide assurance of correct risk management.
Specific benefits listed by participants included the consistency
The interim development in Sharepoint was evaluated and deemed to be not very user friendly as the feedback collected on the IT tool was generally less positive than that collected about the structure of the Risk Register itself, particularly in terms of efficiency. It indicates that a dedicated IT platform may be more beneficial than the Sharepoint solution introduced as a dedicated tool can be more tailored to specific user needs.
Additionally, further data analysis could be achieved within a Risk Register tool, whereas data must currently be exported from the interim solution developed in Sharepoint for further analysis.
Comparison against requirements
The solution currently implemented and the related risk management process have addressed the majority of the identified high level requirements, as described in Table 8 . Only HLR6 was not fully met, in that the risk register provides a single point for the documentation of risks but this is not a fully dynamic process, relying on manual data entry and review at fixed periods. In particular, the process prescribes that all risks are reviewed at least once a month, and updated their details and mitigation plans modified at least:
Once a quarter (for high and medium scored risks);
Once a year (for low risks)
HLR8 All hazards shall be identified, and periodic hazards and risk reviews shall be carried out.
→Already covered by HLR7
HLR9 Key performance indicators shall be developed to ensure that the key hazards have been identified and assessed, that all business risks are regularly reviewed, and that control measures are in place and effective in reducing risks to a tolerable level. (1)
(3) Integration with company asset register; Support a better link with workflow around risk communication;
A potential link with day to day operational practice. Each of these potential improvements are described in the following sections.
Aggregation of risks from station level to central level
The rating scheme of the risks based on the risk matrix is currently used for the purpose of sorting and screening, while the risk register needs to include a further criteria to estimate corresponding classes of monetized risk values to be able to aggregate risks that are in common across multiple stations with different likelihood and exposure in the various impact categories. The risk matrix score is in fact provided ont eh basis of qualitative scales. Qualitative scales are themselves inherently flawed when it comes to aggregate risk. When using qualitative scales, it is very difficult to say how to compare 2
High risks with 3 Medium risks, or how high is a High risk. This is a primary motivation for trying to monetize rating scales.
This is necessary to identify the top ten hazard scenarios relevant across the entire organisation as a whole to facilitate better monitoring by senior management. This will enable hazard categories to be sorted across different stations on the basis of sum of equivalence of economic value of impact multiplied by likelihood for each event category.
The system can ultimately rank risks across equivalent economic ranges for Cat 1 (red) Cat2 (orange) and Cat 3 (yellow) and Cat 4 (green) economic ranges. A trial implementation of this approach has been achieved in the case study organisation. Table 9 reports an example of the resulting aggregated Top Ten issues obtained using the monetized categories. 
Aggregation of risks for safety related outcomes
The tool can now enable to query all the events leading to possible fatality scenario and the initial assumption is that the overall probability of one fatality in the year is the sum of all the individual entries potentially leading to single or multiple fatalities can be considered together with their associated expected value of their likelihood range. If this sum leads to a likelihood above the max value assumed for category 3 in the likelihood scale in case of single fatality and above the values covered by categories 2 in the likelihood scale for multiple fatalities it is flagged to the management team as a company wide inadmissible exposure and it triggers the need to safety intervention. It also highlights all the entries contributing towards that risk.
Support controls over mitigation measures at station and central level
A second issue that the introduction of the risk register in the organisation brought to the fore is how can the tool better support the workflow connected with ensuring appropriate control measures are in place for each risk in each stations and how to share the knowledge about the most effective measures identified so as to foster reinforcement of best practices across different stations. As described in Section 2.5, information on the effectiveness of mitigations is currently captured in a free text space and via a subjective rating. The documented mitigation measures are subsequently audited in each station through the internal risk management audit scheme (which foresees one internal audit to be carried out in each station quarterly) and the current system in place used for accident and inspection reporting is used to document the findings of the audit, where the internal auditor has to confirm whether or not the mitigation measure is in place and how effective it has been found to be. Currently a manual KPI is calculated based on the results of the four risk management audits completed in each station annually to review control measure application defined as a proportion of satisfied audit requirements.
A proposed improvement in risk register would enable the tool to document and support the workflow connected with monitoring and reviewing mitigations through the audit system. This would result in a more accurate assessment of the effectiveness of the mitigations, rather than relying on a subjective effectiveness rating.
Likelihood and updates of events from accident database
The likelihood ratings are also currently subjective, and hence open to bias (either positive or negative). On the basis of the events collected in the accident and incident database of each station it may be possible to inform less subjective estimates for the likelihood ranges of the scenarios to be documented in the risk register.
In common with many other organisations, the company in this case study currently has a different IT system for documenting and classifying accidents and incidents. On the basis of the entries to this system, it is possible to estimate for each hazard category a corresponding rate based on the past six years of reporting history at company level, which in turn can provide the basis to estimate the average number of events per year and use that as a designated rate parameter (λ) in a Poisson distribution. Therefore the system could automatically suggest the probability of observing k events in a year using the Poisson formula: To enable this functionality, the hazard categories collected in the existing accident and incident reporting tools and those used by the risk register will have to be harmonised. Table 10 reports a snapshot of some of the events that can be collected from the incident reporting systems. 4.6. A potential link with day-to-day operational practice
As part of the process safety improvement plan of the company there is an on-going effort to support consistent and efficient transfer of safety, operational and commercial information between operational shifts to reduce the potential for misunderstanding or the non-reporting of technical or commercial events, issues, status or risks though a computerised logging system to improve the management and communication of critical operating information connected to shift handovers. The scope is to achieve the following benefits:
Improved safety of personnel and plant Improved environmental performance Improved commercial performance
Standardisation of plant operation
Regulatory compliance
Operation staff training
Reduction in duplicated reporting
Optimisation and performance of existing systems and processes.
In addition to the above improvements, Process Safety improvements will further require recording of operational abnormalities including: demand on safety systems, plant upsets, insufficient operating discipline, procedures not followed, near misses, etc. as lower tier incidents, which can be then be analysed and improved on. This can also lend itself to a way of improving a two way live feed between an operational log and the risk register as the risk register can provide an overview of the main company risk scenarios relevant for operations but on the other end the operational log can provide info to verify how those risks may actually affect operational practices and introduce new potential risks on the basis of observed deviations from recommended design ranges. If the two systems were able to exchange information automatically it would reduce the amount of information to be manually transferred or input in both.
Conclusions
This paper has described the development and implementation of a company wide Risk Register system and process in an electricity generating business. Although largely successful against the key requirements, the implementation has uncovered areas for future development that can improve risk management further.
The considerations discussed in the previous section would suggest that the best way to further implement the knowledge management capacity of the risk register is by integrating new functions into the current IT system used in the company for accident incident and near miss reporting by providing a further elements for hazard identification (not retrospective in nature) and to follow up the risk review process and the monitoring (audit) for each station and at the same time facilitating the sharing of best practices and information across the multiple locations (as a web based application).
The framework reported in Fig. 8 Further research will focus on furthering this vision, and providing concrete steps to achieving risk intelligence. The initial research focused on identifying what data already exists, and what information can be generated from that data and has already identified the following elements:
(1)
(3) (4)
Need to integrate with existing IT tool used for accident and incident and process safety events The risk register duplicates some of the information the company already collects as part of the Critical asset register. If the critical asset register were to facilitate the collection of the main hazard categories and scenarios associated to asset reporting high risks it would facilitate the establishment of a asset based risk repository that could be generated already as part of the information collected at stations level in the asset register Test cases for each of the above elements will be detailed to identify in practice the feasibility of the IT integration and build a concrete business case, with a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, to highlight the insights and benefits that can be achieved from this information.
